$\begin{matrix} T a x S h e l t e r_{i t} (B T D s; R B T D s; D P D s) = β_{0} + β_{1} F a m i l y f i r m_{i t} + β_{2} P T R O A_{i t} + β_{3} N O L_D_{i t} + β_{4} F O R_D_{i t} + β_{5} D A P_{i t} + β_{6} L E V_{i t} \\ + β_{7} M T B_{i t} + β_{8} E M 1_{i t} + β_{9} E M 2_{i t} + β_{10} Δ P T C F O_{i t} + β_{11} S I Z E_{i t} + ε \end{matrix}$
Variables	Expected sign	Taxshelter = BTDs			Taxshelter = RBTDs			Taxshelter = DPDs
Variables	Expected sign	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)	Coeff (t-stat)
Intercept		0.034**	−0.018**	0.057**	0.046**	−0.016**	0.057**	0.087**	0.045**	0.063**
Famfirm1	+	0.014*			−0.008			0.019**
Famfirm2	+		0.021**			0.003**			0.034*
Famfirm3	+			0.015*			0.001*			0.051**
PTROA	+	0.315*	0.287*	0.328**	0.234**	−0.298	0.417*	0.512**	0.499*	0.298**
NOL_D	+	0.028	0.087*	−0.045	0.022	0.087*	0.057**	−0.069	0.035	0.065*
FOR_D	+	0.064	0.072**	0.093*	0.121*	0.009*	0.233**	−0.321	0.388*	0.219**
DAP	+	0.132*	0.041**	0.054**	0.219*	0.156**	0.033*	−0.045	0.419**	0.132**
LEV	+	0.004*	−0.101	0.051**	−0.003	0.067*	0.102**	0.045*	0.318**	0.019**
MTB	+	0.003	0.101	−0.298*	0.017*	−0.009	0.061	0.019	0.006	0.004
EM1	+	−0.051	0.019**	0.015	0.046*	0.029	0.011*	0.007*	0.034	0.027
EM2	−	0.001	−0.031	0.005**	0.108	−0.008	−0.021	−0.037	0.004*	0.027
ΔPTCFO	−	0.038*	−0.012	0.039**	−0.028	0.016	0.045*	0.034	−0.051**	0.028
SIZE	−	−0.005	0.003*	−0.008*	0.006	−0.011*	0.003**	0.006	0.021**	−0.009*
N		6929	6929	6929	6929	6929	6929	6929	6929	6929
Adj R²		0.275	0.137	0.045	0.298	0.182	0.038	0.301	0.165	0.042
BTDs	The book income less taxable income scaled by lagged total assets;
RBTDs	The portion of book-tax gap not explained by earnings accruals which was developed by Desai and Dharmapala (2006) ;
DPDs	The discretionary permanent difference is the measure of tax sheltering developed by Frank et al. (2009) ;
Famfirm1	At least one family member serves as an officer, director or blockholder (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) .
Famfirm2	Family is the largest voting shareholder, with over 20% voting rights. Meanwhile, at least one family member serves as an officer, and one family member serves as a director (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) .
Famfirm3	At least one member of the 2^nd or later generation serves as an officer, a director or a large shareholder (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) .
PTROA	Pre-tax income at t year divided by total assets at year t − 1;
NOL_D	1 if the net operating loss carry forwards for firm i at year t − 1 are greater than 0; 0 otherwise;
FOR_D	1 if foreign income for firm i at year t is not equal to 0; 0 otherwise;
DAP	The performance-adjusted discretionary accruals suggested by Kothari et al. (2005) ;
LEV	Total debt for firm i at year t, divided by total assets at year t;
MTB	Market value of common equity for firm i at year t − 1, divided by book value of common equity for firm i at year t − 1;
EM1	1 if net income in year t, divided by the market value of common equity at year t − 1, is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 0.01 for firm i, and 0 otherwise;
EM2	1 if the change in net income from year t − 1 to year t, divided by the market value of common equity at year t − 2 is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 0.01 for firm i, and 0 otherwise;
ΔPTCFO	Change in pre-tax cash flow from operations for firm i in year t, divided by total assets for firm i at year t − 1; and
SIZE	The natural logarithm of total assets at book value for firm i at year t.