Year | Market conditions | Thoughts before action | Decision | Remarks |

1979-end | Bulk carriers are profitable; they get high ship prices |
| Sell 2 SD 14 at $15 m each (=$30 m) | No forecasting. Ships could be kept 18 more months; company was tempted to sell due to their high prices |

1980 (it is remarkable how fast market fell) | Ship prices reflect now steel’s cost and machinery’s; expected not to fall further; ships are now cheap | To order 2 tankers… to strengthen balance sheet; to get 2 years nearer the “expected” end of depression… i.e. in 1982 | To order 2 all-purposes tankers 60 k; $35 m each; 60% credit; 8.5% interest; i.e. a debt of $70 m | Wrong action! No forecasting! A periodic cycle 2 + 2 years assumed |

1982-end | Freight rates fall |
| Use of past reserves (out of necessity) | Cash flow inadequate |

1982 | The market price of a product carrier was less than half its new price | low prices offered in Japan; 2 years closer to the “new’ expected end of depression… i.e. 1984 | To order 1 60 k product carrier at $25 m; 60% credit; debt $25 m; total debt $95 m | No forecasting. Periodic cycle of 2 + 2 years assumed again. |

1983 | Depression peaks |
| To sell 4 bulk carriers at $20 m; and scrap the VLCC at $4 m (get $84 m) | Funds left $13 m, but proved inadequate. |

1984 | Low ship prices | Bankruptcy threat | $9 m increase | Company left with: $15 m loans & a market worth of $22 m! |