Patient asks his cryptographic USB to create a key pair and attaches it to DID

D.1 Patient $\to$ USB—Patient : DID

D.2 USB—Patient $\to$ Patient : k_b

Patient sends his identifier k₀ to HAP requests his attributes $a_1,\cdots ,a_n$ and asks him to link them do DID and k_b

D.3 Patient $\to$ HAP : k₀, DID, k_b, $a_1,\cdots ,a_n$

HAP challenges patient to prove that he is the owner of k₀ and k_b

D.4 HAP $\to$ Patient : k₀, N_p

D.5 Patient $\to$ USB—Patient : HAP, H(k₀, N_p)

D.6 USB—Patient $\to$ Patient : ${\left\{H\left(k_0,N_p\right)\right\}}_{k_0^{-1}}$

D.7 Patient $\to$ USB—Patient : DID, H(k_b, N_p)

D.8 USB—Patient $\to$ Patient : ${\left\{H\left(k_b,N_p\right)\right\}}_{k_b^{-1}}$

D.9 Patient $\to$ HAP : ${\left\{H\left(k_0,N_p\right)\right\}}_{k_0^{-1}},{\left\{H\left(k_b,N_p\right)\right\}}_{k_b^{-1}}$

HAP asks his USB to sign the link between DID and kb and stores the result in Indy

D.10 HAP $\to$ USB—HAP : HAP, H(DID, k_b)

D.11 USB—HAP $\to$ HAP : ${\left\{H\left(DID,k_b\right)\right\}}_{k_p^{-1}}$

D.12 HAP $\to$ Indy : DID, k_b, ${\left\{H\left(DID,k_b\right)\right\}}_{k_p^{-1}}$

HAP looks for the address of the EMR in his database and requests it from IPFS

D.13 HAP $\to$ HAP—DB : k₀

D.14 HAP—DB $\to$ HAP : k₀, H(F), ${\left\{k\right\}}_{k_p}$

D.15 HAP $\to$ IPFS : H(F)

D.16 IPFS $\to$ HAP : ${\left\{EMR\right\}}_k$

HAP attaches EMR to DID and saves it in IPFS

D.17 HAP $\to$ IPFS : $\underset{F_1}{\underbrace{\underset{M}{\underbrace{DID,{\left\{EMR\right\}}_k}},{\left\{H\left(M\right)\right\}}_{k_p^{-1}}}}$

HAP sends to Patient the IPFS address of the requested EMR with its protection key

D.18 HAP $\to$ Patient : H(F₁), ${\left\{k\right\}}_{k_0}$

Patient saves the name of attributes, the address of their EMR and their protection key in his Wallet

D.19 Patient $\to$ Wallet : $a_1,\cdots ,a_n$ , H(F₁), ${\left\{k\right\}}_{k_0}$