Chen, Ng, and Tsang (2015) [25]

・ Examine whether mandatory IFRS adoption facilitates firms’ cross-listing activities.

・ Sample of international cross-listings spanning 34 (50) home (target) countries, of 1181 cross-listed firms (14,761 non cross listed firms), 608 (5750) of which from IFRS adopting countries for periods 2003-2004 and 2006-2007.

・ Firms mandatory IFRS adopters exhibit significantly higher cross-listing propensity and intensity following IFRS adoption.

・ Firms from mandatory IFRS adoption countries are more likely to cross-list their securities in countries also mandating IFRS and countries with larger and more liquid capital markets.

・ IFRS adoption has a greater effect on mandatory IFRS adopters from countries with larger accounting differences from IFRS, lower disclosure requirements, and less access to external capital prior to IFRS adoption.

・ Mandatory IFRS adoption facilitates firms’ cross-listing activities and highlight the importance of considering the change in cross- listings when examining the capital market consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption.

De Fond, Hu, Hung, and Li (2011) [18]

・ Examine the effect of adopting a uniform set of accounting standards like the mandatory IFRS adoption on comparability and cross-border investment.

・ Examine the change in foreign mutual fund investment in firms that began using IFRS after its mandatory adoption in the European Union (EU) in 2005.

・ Sample of 8995 firms with 35,980 firm year observations from periods 2003-2004 and 2006-2007. Mandatory IFRS adopters are 1365 firms with 5460 year observations from 14 EU countries. Non IFRS adopters are 10 countries globally.

・ Mandatory IFRS adoption results in a greater increase in foreign investment among companies in countries with strong implementation credibility that experience relatively large increases in uniformity, and these firms show significantly increase in foreign mutual fund ownership.

・ Improved comparability associated with mandatory IFRS adoption does not increase domestic mutual fund ownership, since domestic investors being more familiar with local accounting standards.

・ The increase in foreign mutual fund ownership in response to improved comparability is primarily driven by foreign global mutual funds.

Francis, Huang, Khurana, (2012) [17]

・ Investigate whether differences in accounting standards across countries inhibit firms from investing in foreign markets.

・ Sample 37,384 frequency M & A activities of 32 countries for period 1998 to 2004 with 643 country pairs, representing 32 acquirer and 32 target countries.

・ The volume of M & A activity across country pairs is larger for pairs of countries with similar Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

・ The takeover premium is higher if target countries’ GAAP is similar to that of the acquiring firm’s country.

・ The 2005 mandatory adoption of IFRS increased cross-border M & As among IFRS adopting countries, and that this increase is more pronounced for country pairs with low degree of similarity in GAAP in the pre-IFRS adoption period.

Florou and Pope (2012) [12]

・ Examine whether the mandatory introduction of IFRS leads to an increase in institutional investor demand for equities.

・ Sample of 45 countries, 10,852 firms and 35,160 firm year observations from 2003 to 2006.

・ Institutional holdings increase for mandatory IFRS adopters.

・ Benefits from higher quality of financial statements, derived by IFRS, are evident on institutional holdings.

Gordon, Loeb and Zhu (2012) [19]

・ Test the basic argument that the adoption of IFRS by a country results in increased foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows.

・ Sample of 1343 observations covering 124 countries, for the period 1996 to 2009.

・ Adoption of IFRS leads to increased FDI inflows.

・ The overall increase in FDI inflows from IFRS adoption is due to the increase in FDI inflows by countries with developing economies.

・ A key potential driver for IFRS adoption by countries with developing economies is the desire to receive financial aid from the World Bank.