1998 FIFA World Cup Dataset

Martin Arlitt

April 30, 1998-July 26, 1998

Real

-1.35 billion requests

HTTP attack

307 MB

available

-Timestamp resolution of 1 second

DoS_80- 20110715 [12]

University of Southern California- Information Sciences Institute

July 15, 2011

Simulation

- Consist of only one attack

TCP SYN/ ACK attack

32.31 GB

Restricted

-8 known false positives already defined

-There is a lot of many identical packets

DoS_80_ timeseries- 20020629

University of Southern California- Information Sciences Institute

June 29, 2002 to Nov 30, 2003

Real

-Time series of 80 DoS attacks

- one millisecond granularity time series of 80 DoS attacks

Reflector attack, TCP no-flag attack, IP proto attack

783.1 MB

Quasi- restricted

-shortest time series of 1 millisecond granularity

DoS_traces- 20020629

University of Southern California- Information Sciences Institute

Jun 29, 2002 to Aug 14, 2002

Real

-Time series of 80 DoS attacks

- one millisecond granularity time series of 80 DoS attacks

Reflector attack

TCP-no flag attack

IP-proto 255 attack

4.1 GB

Restricted

FRGPNTP Flow Data-20131201

Colorado State University

Dec 01, 2013 to Feb 28, 2014

Anonymized

3 months daily NTP in Argus flow on 10 Gb/s link

NTP reflection attack

3.5 TB

Restricted

FRGP_NTP_ Flow_Data_ anon- 20131201

University of Southern California- Information Sciences Institute

Dec 01, 2013 to Feb 28, 2014

Anonymized

3 months daily NTP in Argus flow on 10 Gb/s link

Attackers trigger attacks by sending monlist queries containing spoofed IP addresses to NTP running hosts.

Hosts reply with list of last clients

NTP reflection attack

726.7 GB

Quasi- Restricted

Large set of data containing vectors to measure multiple attack types including spoofing

FRGP_SSDP_ Reflection_ DDoS_Attack_ Traffic- 20140930

Colorado State University

Sept 30, 2014

Simulated

-UDP simple service discovery protocol (SSDP) attack traffic

-attack flow on 10 Gb/s link

-attack triggered via UPnP/SSDP discovery using spoofed source IP to vulnerable hosts running SSDP

SSDP reflection attack

26 GB

Restricted

FRGP_SSDP_ Reflection_ DDoS_Attack_ Traffic_anon- 20140930

University of Southern California-Information Sciences Institute

Sept 30, 2014

Anonymized/ simulated

-3 hour DDoS attack traffic using Argus

-UDP simple service discovery protocol (SSDP) attack traffic

-attack flow on 10 Gb/s link

-Uses prefix-preserving algorithm to anonymize IPs

attack triggered via UPnP/SSDP discovery using spoofed source IP to vulnerable hosts running SSDP

SSDP reflection attack

4.99 GB

Quasi- Restricted