Issue/model | Summary of Socially Optimum Condition |
Allocating a Total Defensive Expenditure among Multiple Independent Sites. | Equate the marginal expected social costs avoided (MESCA) across sites; possibly no protection at some sites. |
Advanced Persistent Threat: Technological or Behavioral Constraint on Probability or Cost Reduction. | Technological or behavioral constraints can result in an optimal inequality among sites even where investment occurs. |
Allocation of Expenditures Across Damage and Probability-Reducing Activities. | Equate the marginal social cost avoided of each type of expenditure where expenditures are positive (some may be below threshold). |
Public Goods, Border control and Positive Interdependencies. | Invest until the sum of their marginal damage cost avoided equals the individual site MESCA. |
Site Interdependencies Due to Displacing the Probability of Attack. | Determine the net MESCA, net of probability increasing effects at other sites; sites of attack may be spread but social costs reduced. |
Multiple Sources of Probability (All Hazards) and Cost, as with false positives and false negatives from behavioral controls. | The form of the allocation decision is the same (e.g. equate MESCA), but all costs and probabilities should be taken into account. |