|
| Exp. | House Model | Senate Model |
| Key Explanatory Variables | Sign | Coefficient (s.e.) | Coefficient (s.e.) |
| Support for the President (House) | + | 1.338 (.366)** |
|
| Support for the President (Senate) | + |
| 1.357 (.362)** |
| Conservativism (House) | + | 2.395 (.727)** |
|
| Conservativism (Senate) | + |
| 1.395 (.396)** |
| Contextual Controls |
|
|
|
| Misery Index [t − 1] | + | .018 (.067) | .003 (.093) |
| Presidential Approval [t − 1] | - | .040 (.018)* | .039 (.020) |
| Democrat Party Majority | Null | 1.020 (.892) | −.303 (.777) |
| Presidential Election Cycle | + | .883 (.446)* | .364 (.490) |
| Republican President | + | −1.513 (.779) | −1.221 (.675) |
| US Hegemonic Power | - | −10.312 (34.196) | −19.224 (21.833) |
| World Disputes | + | .042 (.012)** | .063 (.019)** |
| Cold War | + | −.330 (.763) | −.773 (.706) |
| Conflict Specific Controls |
|
|
|
| Violent Trigger | + | −.327 (.337) | −.407 (.327) |
| Power Disparity | + | .004 (.003) | .003 (.003) |
| Geostrategic Salience | + | 2.148 (.473)** | 2.112 (.466)** |
| US Ally | + | −.152 (.481) | −.161 (.452) |
| Non-Democratic Actor | + | .404 (.443) | .339 (.423) |
| Constant |
| −8.068 (1.734)** | −8.037 (1.828)** |
| Presidential Fixed Effects |
| Yes | Yes |
| McFadden Pseudo R2 |
| .56 | .56 |
| Deviance |
| 143.9 | 143.6 |
| AIC |
| 187.9 | 187.6 |
| BIC |
| 278.7 | 278.4 |
| n |
| 458 | 458 |