| Government | Trade unions |
| In Case 2 there’s no effect on the markets, so the resulting payoff is: (g1, t1) = (0, 0) | When trade unions fight and can achieve what they want, their payoff is higher: t4 > t3 |
| Case 1 and Case 3 are better than Case 2 in terms of final equilibrium: g1 > g2, g3 > g2 | Case 2 is better than Case 4 as trade unions are able to achieve what they want without fighting and losing money: t2 > t4 |
| The LR effects of Cases 1 and 3 are identical, while in SR Case 3 results in decrease in output: g1 > g3 | Case 1 is better than Case 3 as trade unions are able to achieve what they want without fighting and losing money: t1 > t3 |
| The LR effects of Cases 2 and 4 are identical, while in SR Case 4 results in decrease in output: g2 > g4 | Case 1 is worse than Case 2 because trade unions lose their power due to not fighting the pension reform: t2 > t1 |
| Case 3 is better than Case 4 in terms of more efficient SR equilibrium | Case 4 is better than Case 1 as it results in the equilibrium that trade unions want to achieve event through protesting and stacking: t4 > t1 |